Circularity Of Knowledge: A Model Of Integration Between Science And Religion

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Abstract
This study is an effort to outline the integration of science and religion in Islamic worldview. The Islamic worldview is divided into three existences: The God (mawjūd al-Khāliq); empirical reality (mawjūd fī al-khārij); and the mental processes (mawjūd fī al-adhḥān). In the world of mental processes, human knowledge is seen cumulatively advanced for the truth. Based on the historicity and dialectic of understanding, this study focused on the condition of plurality of knowledge. We found maqāṣid al-sharī’ah as the knowledge speaking of the purpose of the nature creation (al-qāṣd al-khalq al-takwīnī). It was discovered that this maqāṣid is at the meta-level for the Islamic religious group of knowledge. Maqāṣid al-sharī’ah becomes meta-tafsir and circulates with meta-sociology and meta-science. It completes the knowledge in the three relationships of human: the relation with God; the relation between humans; and the relation with nature. Knowledge in the world of mental processes fulfills the missing part based on the concept of the three Islamic worlds. Besides, the knowledge in these three worlds is circularly integrated and where it began is unknown. Thus, the circularity of knowledge is a promising integration model.

Keywords: Circular, Model, Integration

INTRODUCTION
Referring to the classical Islamic tradition of knowledge, it can be understood that science and religion are treated in integration (Zainal Abidin Bagir, Jarot Wahyudi, and Afnan Anshori 2005). However, later Muslim scientists experienced the conflict between science and religion. Kuntowijoyo stated that there was a differentiation between science and religion and he offered his idea of integration (Kuntowijoyo 2006).

The conflict of science and religion occurs on metaphysical level. The metaphysics of science puts forward ontological claims about what there is in the world (Esfeld 2018). We suspected that it is because the worldview see the reality only in physical and metaphysical categories. As a result, the claims—as abstraction from physical reality—are considered equal to metaphysical-divine reality. It means that the divine reality is reduced to human reality where scientific claims are favored.
On the other hands, the discussion of contemporary philosophers raises demands to differentiate between metaphysical-divine reality and ‘metaphysical’ concepts abstracted from the physical reality. When the idea of Thomas S. Kuhn’s paradigm was explained and discussed in the context of science revolution (Reisch 2019). Whether it was conscious or not, Kuhn has built a “different” reality in which human knowledge is seen cumulatively, so that it can be declared progressing (Fuad, Wibisono S., and Hadi 2016). Likewise, when Karl R. Popper proposed his idea on falsification, there was also the emergence of another independent world (Popper 1972).

Similarly, in social science, it also appears in the emergence of the term hyper-reality and meta-sociology. Also, in the hermeneutical discussion of objectivity and subjectivity of understanding, another ‘world’ arises when triadic relationships between interpreters, signs and objects are proposed as a solution by Paul Ricouer (Bleicher 1980). All this indicates the existence of “the world of mental processes” which, in the classification of al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH / 1111 AD), is referred to mawjūd fī al-adhhān (Al-Ghazālī 1961).

Sorting out the metaphysical-divine reality from the ‘metaphysical’ concept is necessary before starting the discussions for two reasons. First, this sorting clarifies what is meant by ‘religion and science are integrated’. The mix of these two leads to science treated as religion, and religion is reduced to science. Hence, the idea of integrating religion and science is impossible because of the obscurity of objects. Second, the sorting referred to is a necessity when the technical integration approach is carried out. Barbour identified four approach categories: conflict, independence, dialogue and integration (Barbour 2000), while John F. Haught called them conflict, contrast, contact, and confirmation approach (Haught 1995).

These offers raise questions about the ideal model in the Islamic epistemology. It is necessary to find the ideal model based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, so that it can be accepted as the acceptance of the Qur’an. This effort—if considered effective—can be dedicated to narrowing the diversity of alternative approaches. The issue studied here starts from the problem concerning the area of demarcation between physical reality (there are creatures) and the metaphysical region (there is God). Furthermore, the study dived on the issue of the existence of universals in the scientific epistemology. Besides the discussion of universals as the second substance after an actual reality, it must be admitted that the universal datum has an undoubtful objective reference (Gallagher 1964).

A moderate attitude towards universal datum is the basis to see knowledge in the frame of historicity of understanding and dialectic of understanding (H. G. Gadamer 1975). This theory is useful for understanding the science relationships at the level of singularity and plurality. The understanding of this relationship establishes a new perspective, both in the context of religious science groups and the natural and social sciences. Then, the ideal integration model can be formulated. We believe that the integration can be done fully, so this study is done by employing rational, critical, reflective, and argumentative philosophy as the method.

**ISLAMIC WORLDVIEW OF KNOWLEDGE**

Linguistically, the word integration is defined as intermingling to become a whole or rounded entity. However, from the perspective of the world, based on the concept of the two worlds (physical-metaphysical), complete integration seems impossible. Of course, this impression must not eliminate the integration effort itself. Science is systematic knowledge, but according to The Liang Gie (Gie
1997), science must also be an activity and method. In addition, Bambang Sugiharto argued that the postmodernist view of the ontology of human knowledge has shifted because they see knowledge as the ‘association’ with objects, instead of the ‘copy’ of objects (Sugiharto 1996). At this level, science as a knowledge is more seen in the condition of plurality than singularity, especially if it is associated with the idea of the development of science (Abrar 2017).

The perspective above became possible after the idea of the scientific revolution of Thomas S. Kuhn had emerged. At the end of the Renaissance, the term scientific revolution was understood in the sense of the singular scientific revolution. However, with the services of Kuhn, this term means a plural scientific revolution. Kuhn emphasized that the concept of understanding reality is not as produced by subject awareness; that the real thing is that which is understood by the subject, but the one corresponds to the original object (Hoyningen-Huene 1989).

This concept is clearer when it is viewed from the perspective of hermeneutics, where true knowledge is a historicity of understanding and in the form of dialectic of understanding (H.-G. Gadamer 1976). From this point of view, science is seen cumulatively as described by Karl R. Popper, that it undergoes a continuous revolution to achieve the truth. Thus, science is seen correlatively and integratively, where understanding takes place dialectically through historical openness in its universal ontological framework (Fuad, Wibisono S., and Hadi 2016).

Popper's view of the universal ontological truth teaches realism about the existence of a world independent from humans (external world) (Salmon 1981). Here is the realist attitude of Popper, who explicitly proposed three worlds: the physical, the mental processes, and the autonomous metaphysical world (Popper 1983). This sorting distinguishes the abstraction of physical reality concepts from pure metaphysical concepts. Even though the boundary between the two is not clear, this sorting is a methodological demand, so that people are getting closer to the truth. Then, what is meant by pure metaphysical world?

According to Louis O. Katts off, metaphysics consists of ontology and cosmology. Ontology talks about rational principles for what is available, while cosmology talks about rational principles for the orderly (Kattsoff 1953). In general, the term metaphysics is applied to any enquiry that raises questions about the reality lying beyond or behind those that are capable of being tackled by the methods of science (Blackburn 2005). In its application, metaphysics (mā ba’d al-ṭabi‘ah) includes the study of divine knowledge (ma‘rifat Allāh wa al-nafs) (Majma‘ al-Luhghah al-‘Arabiyyah 1983): This scope of metaphysics raises criticism from philosophers and scientists for various reasons. Metaphysics is considered impossible, for example, unless it is converted to scientific metaphysics. Even so metaphysics has remained as it is to date, and reflects the dynamics of change associated with the world’s evolution (Marcum 2017). The ambiguity of the boundary between “science metaphysics” and “pure metaphysics” is supposed to be the cause of the emergence of conflicts between science and religion. Even the term of metaphysics itself cannot be given a clear definition because the nature of scientific assumptions are also metaphysically.

Turning to the Islamic scientific tradition, metaphysical discussions are also quite difficult between materialist extremists and idealist extremists. However, there seems to be an agreement not to reduce the reality of Khāliq into the reality of makhlūq, because that means shirk. Between these two extreme poles is the moderate thought (tawāsuṭ) which lasts longer, until finally Islamic philosophy stagnates in 6th H (Madkūr 2003; Kamal 2019). One moderate figure is al-Ghazālī, who
saw reality in a dualistic way, namely there is a being and there are beings. A being is then divided into four hierarchies: 1) it exists sensually-empirically (mawjūd fī al-khārij); 2) it exists metaphysically-rationally (mawjūd fī al-adhdhān); 3) it exists in in the form of word (mawjūd fī al-alfāż); and 4) is in the form of writing (mawjūd fī al-kitābah) (Al-Ghazālī 1961).

What al-Ghazālī called “mawjūd fī al-adhdhān” is what Popper called “the world of mental processes.” In the tradition of Islamic scholarship, the world of mental processes is developed not in descriptive-theoretical sciences, or even applied science. For example, al-ashbāh wa al-naẓār’ir in the study of Islamic law (Shalabī 1985). The existence of al-ashbāh wa al-naẓār’ir shows another moderate thought in the tradition of Islamic scholarship, namely a moderate-dualistic towards the existence of particulars and universals. Moderate attitude (dualism) towards the existence of the Creator-creations and the existence of particulars-universals delivers the view of the three worlds.

Based on this description, it can be concluded, that worldview in the Islamic scientific tradition has known the concept of three worlds (mawjudāt). The first mawjūd is the existence of Allah (mawjūd al-Khāliiq) who is a pure metaphysical world. The other two forms are in the category of being, namely sensual-empirical existence (mawjūd fī al-khārij) and rational-metaphysical existence (mawjūd fī al-adhdhān). Thus, knowledge also has three categories, namely the knowledge of pure metaphysical reality, the knowledge of empirical reality and the knowledge of metaphysical-rational reality.

THE NATURE OF RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTEGRATION

The study focused on the ontology, meaning the existence, substance and essence of Islam. Existence is present in the actual sense, so Islam exists through shahadah (testimony). Therefore, a person is declared Muslim if s/he has shahadah, namely the shahadah tawhid (declaring the beliefs in the oneness of God) and shahadah rasul (the acceptance of Muhammad as God’s messenger). While the substance of Islam is the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah, because both are sources for ‘materials’ and ‘form’ of Islamic teachings. Meanwhile, the essence of Islam is moderates (al-wasatiyyah), because tawāsuṭ is the deepest essence of Islam (Al-Ṣalābī 2001).

The Qur’an, the substance of religion, is the body of Islam, so that Islam is identical with the Qur’an. Thus, in the discussion of the integration of science and religion, the essence of Islam can be narrowed to the Qur’an. So, the integration of science and religion is basically the integration between science and the teachings of the Qur’an. According to Fazlur Rahman (Rahman 2009), Qur’an contains eight major themes as follows.

1. The existence of Islam: Shahada tawhid and shahada rasul.
2. The substance of Islam: the teaching of the Qur’an and Sunnah
3. The essence of Islam: moderates (al-wasatiyyah)

Fugure1. The contents of the Qur’an as an Islamic substance

Major themes of the Qur’an:
1. God;
2. Man as individual;
3. Man in society;
4. Nature;
5. Prophethood and revelation;
6. Eschatology;
7. Satan and evil
8. Emergence of the muslim community.
Based on the major themes of the Qur’an, it shows that some information about the reality of sensual-empiric (mawjūd fī al-khārij) is in the Qur’an. In the science of Qur’an (‘ulûm al-Qur’ān), this is developed into a branch of knowledge called al-taṣfîr al-‘ilmî. The method applied in the study of taṣfîr (Qur’an interpretation or commentary) is a thematic interpretation (al-taṣfîr al-mauwîdî), born in the 17th H. The scholars stated that the al-taṣfîr al-mauwîdî is a knowledge covering various topics following the intention of the Qur’an in various Surah (Muslim 2005).

The material object of taṣfîr is the Quranic verse in the form of words or lafz (Kattsoff 1953). Therefore, taṣfîr is classified into the type of empirical knowledge, because the word as a “physical object” must have valid references (Gallagher 1964). Viewing from the formal object, the study of al-taṣfîr al-mauwîdî is the knowledge at the singular level, namely the linguistic aspect of the Quranic verses (Al-Ṣâbûnî 2003). One interpretation may differ from other interpretations or even contradict. Relying on the condition of the singularity, this different interpretation cannot be judged to be true or false, because it is a scientific truth according to their respective paradigms (Kuhn 1970). Thus, in terms of the condition of the singularity, the relative nature of the findings of al-taṣfîr al-‘ilmî is no different from natural science and the discussion about the progress of taṣfîr must be done at the level of plurality of knowledge.

Judging from the developments in the current Islamic knowledge, the point of view of taṣfîr plurality is possible with the presence of the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah because its material object is context (al-ma‘nî), instead of text. Similarly, the formal object is not linguistic but philosophical aspects. In this case, we should be grateful to Muhammad al-Ṭāhir ibn ‘Āshūr (d. 1394 AH/1973 AD) who had established the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah as an independence knowledge (‘Āshūr 2005). He also talked about the existence of fitrah (the state of purity) as the principle of maqāṣid al-shari‘ah, so the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah discusses not only the aim of sharia (al-qâṣd al-tashrî‘î), but also the purpose of creation (al-qâṣd al-khalq al-takwînî) (Sabil 2018).

It should be noted, that al-Shâṭibî (d. 790 H/1388 AD), who first made the systematics of the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah, rejected al-qâṣd al-khalq al-takwînî (Al-Shâṭibî, n.d.) because it is not related and unnecessary for the study of fiqh. While Ibn ‘Āshūr believed it is important and therefore it was made the principle of maqāṣid al-shari‘ah. Hence, it is clear that what Ibn ‘Āshūr did was an update of maqāṣid al-shari‘ah and also an update on the construction of Islamic scholarship. This inspired us to examine the possibility of integrating science and religion based on Islamic scientific construction that has accommodated the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah.

The method used in maqāṣid al-shari‘ah to derive conceptual knowledge from Quranic text is al-istiqrā‘ al-ma‘nawî. People observe Quranic text as sensory objects (maḥṣûs) to arrive at the abstraction (ma‘qûl). Whereas al-istiqrā‘ al-ma‘nawî is a method that does not hold on to one text (aşl mu‘ayyân), but unites all arguments, including the general, limited and particular argument. This is done together with the instructions and conditions accompanying the arguments (‘Alwân 1989). Therefore, the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah (al-qâṣd al-tashrî‘î and al-qâṣd al-khalq al-takwînî) has the potential to become meta-taṣfîr to see the Quranic interpretation at the level of plurality.

Islam, whose substance is the Qur’an, is knowledge (knowledge of Qur’an), and then the maqāṣid completes it based on the concept of the three worlds. First, the Qur’an contains knowledge about the pure metaphysical world. Second, the Qur’an also consists of knowledge about the world of mental processes, i.e. the maqāṣid al-shari‘ah. Third, the Qur’an also comprise knowledge about
the physical world. Thus, Islam has a balanced structure with the worldview of three worlds which can be described as follows.

Table 1. The structure of the worldview of three worlds in Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Worlds Worldview</th>
<th>Human Knowledge</th>
<th>Quranic Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pure metaphysical world</td>
<td>Cannot reach pure</td>
<td>Qur’an reveals about pure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mawjūd al-Khāliq)</td>
<td>metaphysical world</td>
<td>metaphysical world information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The world of mental</td>
<td>Existing universal</td>
<td>Existing maqāṣid al-shari‘ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process (mawjūd fī al-</td>
<td>concept as abstraction</td>
<td>from Qur’an (al-qaṣd al-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adhdhān)</td>
<td>from empirical reality</td>
<td>tashyri‘ī and al-qaṣd al-khalq al-takwīnī)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Physical world (mawjūd</td>
<td>The existing of natural and</td>
<td>Qur’an reveals some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fī al-khārij)</td>
<td>social knowledge</td>
<td>empirical reality information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that the Islamic scientific tradition clearly divides the three worlds. Then, with the information about the three worlds in the Qur’an, the knowledge gained by humans is based on reasoning with the knowledge of the Qur’an, as described as follows.

Figure 2. Dialectics Intellect with the Qur’an

This illustration in Figure 2 describes the content of the Quranic knowledge as an inverted pyramid, from a pure metaphysical world to a physical world. It is believed that the Qur’an gives a lot of information about the pure metaphysical world and a little about the physical world. Meanwhile, empirical science is described as a pyramid that increasingly narrowed into a pure metaphysical world. So, very limited empirical knowledge that can be brought to the pure metaphysical world. Considering the illustration in Figure 2, we believe that the relationship between science and religion is not just dialectic but circular. Islam is the (quranic) knowledge, so the knowledge can be integrated with knowledge.

**CIRCULAR INTEGRATION MODEL**
The word ‘model’ based on the Great dictionary of Bahasa (Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia-KBBI) means a pattern (example, reference range, etc.) of something that will be created or produced. In the context of this writing, the word model is interpreted as a parable, analogy, or an allusion to the phenomenon studied. As a parable of a reality, a model is simplified, meaning that not all aspects, characteristics, or elements of reality can appear in a model (Ahimsa-Putra 2016). Thus, the model presented here does not illustrate the detail but overall operation of integration.

Based on worldview of three worlds, it is believed that Islam places the Qur’an as a source of knowledge in addition to intellect and experience. Besides, Muslims are also ordered to think and investigate nature. This order is impossible to exist, if thinking and investigating nature undermines the knowledge conveyed by the Qur’an itself. So, the most logical assumption is that all of them are integrated to the truth. In this case, we believes that the integration is not just a dialogue, but in the form of a circular relationship as in a system.

‘Circle or circular in English means circular motion and the equivalent in Arabic is mustadīr or dā’īrī (Al-Ba’albakī 1973). In the context of philosophy, the word circular (dawr) is defined as the endless circle motion (Majma’ al-Luhghah al-‘Arabiyyah 1983). Circularity in a system is circular relationships between components, meaning that the initial causal relationships cannot be traced from a component (Muadz 2014). Likewise, the relationship between information from the Qur’an, investigation, and thinking activities are connected circularly to obtain knowledge.

This pattern of circular relations can be used moderately as a model in the context of the integration of science and religion. If two moderate attitudes have been mentioned previously (moderate to the existence of creator-creatures and particular-universal), there are two other moderate attitudes: moderate to a priori and a posteriori of knowledge and moderate between knowledge in personal context and knowledge in a communal context. These two moderate attitudes are closely related to the existence of three means of knowing: senses; intellect; and intuition.

As the revelation, the Qur’an is a priori knowledge (darūrī) which was heard (sam’ī) from the Prophet PBUH and transferred from generation to generation as knowledge (naqlī). On the other hand, humans also have a posteriori knowledge (nażarī) going through the process of inference. Inferential knowledge can be called a human product but a priori knowledge can not. Given the interpretation of the Qur’an through the process of inference, it is necessary to moderate between the a priori nature of revelation and the a posteriori nature of interpretation as a product. According to Ricoeur, the world of the text is therefore not the world of everyday language (Ricoeur 2016).

Al-Shāṭibī warned that the Sharia was revealed in Arabic to be understood (waḍ‘ al-sharī‘ah li al-ifhām) (Al-Shāṭibī, n.d.). So, the Quranic text must be believed to be able to contain the ontological-objective messages that God wants to convey (al-ifhām) (Al-Zarkasyī 2005). Epistemologically, the ability of people to understand the Qur’an as a text varies resulting in differences in interpretation (al-fahm). However, according to al-Shāṭibī, the objective Quranic information (al-ifhām) can be achieved by the al-istiqrā‘ al-ma’nawī method, meaning that interpretation must be seen from the condition of its universal plurality.

Looking at the level of universal plurality, the study of interpretation is an ongoing process to achieve the maqāṣid that God wants to convey in the Qur’an. It is possible with the birth of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah because the truth of the interpretation in a singular-particular state is relative, not absolute. Then based on the historicity of understanding, the interpretation is getting closer to the truth. In this
case, interpretation will satisfy human desire for truth, if it meets certain methodological-epistemological demands following the type of information. Based on the information in the Qur’an, the methodology requires sensory observation for verses that provide information about the physical world.

Uniquely, the Qur’an commands to observe the natural world so that the interpretation of the verse is circular with the results of observations. For example, verse 80 Surah 26 (Al-Syu’ara’), translation: “And if I am sick, He Who Heals me.” According to al-Ghazālī, this verse will not be understood, except by people who understand medicine well (Al-Ghazālī 2005). When seen at the level of singularity, medical science adheres to natural causality (physical world), in terms of healing. If this causality is considered a determinant, there is a conflict with the above verse. In addition, the condition of the singularity of interpretation lead to textual-partial understanding, so the contradiction is inevitable. Therefore, al-Ghazālī’s statement must be understood at the level of plurality of sciences, where the interpretation uses the maqāṣidī approach. At this level, science is seen cumulatively so that it does not absolve its own truth.

The above example shows that science and religion cannot be integrated at the level of singularity because, in its singularity, science is bound by ontological basic assumptions and its basic epistemological assumptions. While the effort to change these two basic assumptions undermines science itself, because science cannot work without methods and theories. However, if the integration program is carried out earlier in learning, science and religion can be treated informatively, that both are mutually confirmative, and correct each other. It can be concluded, that the integration of science and religion can only be done at the level of plurality of science, that is, along with the reduced tendency to absolve one of them.

At this level of plurality, science can be referred to as knowledge in the world of mental processes, the term meta-science may be used. Likewise, the interpretation using the maqāṣidī approach, at the level of plurality also enters the world of mental process. As Ibn ‘Ashūr explained that the material object of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah is no longer the Qur’an in the sense of the text but is philosophical (‘Ashūr 2005). The discovery of maqāṣid is precisely through various interpretations cumulatively. So, interpretation using the maqāṣidī approach can be expressed as meta-tafsir. Interpretation also requires an appropriate approach, so that the objectivity of understanding is acknowledge to be true. Since humans experience three relations in their lives, there are also three the epistemological approaches. First is human relationship as a ‘small subject’ with their God as the ‘big subject’ (subject-SUBJECT relations). Second, the relationship of fellow human beings, in which a person is the subject of building relationships with other subjects (subject relations). Third, human relations as subjects with the nature as objects (subject-object relations) (Muadz 2014).

The relation with ‘big subject’ (Allah) is mediated by the Qur’an, so the bayānī approach applies, with the intellectual as a means of understanding it. As for the relationship between subjects, the means of knowing are intuition (dhawq), so the approach used is ‘irfānī. While in the subject-object relationship, the burhānī approach applies, because the means are the senses. These three relations take place in the physical world and it can be illustrated as follows.

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The truth of the relation of ‘pure metaphysical world’ to humans in the ‘physical world’ can be accepted after moderating a priori and a posteriori knowledge in a dualistic manner. That is, on the one hand, the Qur’an is a revelation that conveys information from the pure metaphysical to the physical world. On the other hand, relations take place sensually, because the Qur’an exists as a text in the physical world. Similarly, the relation of subject-object (human and nature) takes place in the physical world in a sensory way. However, the relations between subjects (fellow human beings) are not sensory. This fact becomes absurd for integration efforts, because fellow human relations (subjects) occur through intuition, so it employs the ‘irfānī approach. As a result, the relationship between subjects do not have methods as the path of truth. However, this problem can be solved by looking at the level of plurality of knowledge, by moderation was conducted between intuitive knowledge in a personal and communal context.

Based on the relations to the three means of knowing human beings (intuition, intellect and senses), the relations between subjects occur at intuition (Sabil 2016). If a method is defined as the way humans know, then intuition has no method. However, if the method is seen in the way intuitive knowledge can be accepted by people, then the method means how to explicitly abstract objects. In this case, the Hermeneut discussion has arrived at moderation. Following Paul Ricoeur, Josef Bleicher agreed that triadic relations between signs, interpreters and objects open the possibility of achieving objective interpretations (Bleicher 1980). Then intuitive knowledge can be seen cumulatively and accepted based on inter-subjective truth. In this way, the existence of intuitive knowledge is not denied but restricted.

This limitation is also closely related to the axiological aspects of science, namely its usefulness for the development of knowledge and life. At this level, scientific responsibility can be guaranteed based on the inter-subjective truth. Given that the need at the policy level is related to the public interest, strong social science underlies policy at its plurality level. Hence, what can be held is meta-sociology in its plurality, because it is a cumulative social science and at the level of the world of mental processes.

Based on the previous discussion, it can be concluded that there are three knowledge at the level of the world of mental processes, namely meta-tafsir, meta-sociology and meta-science. In this case, meta-sociology and meta-science are intersectional with maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah because maqāṣid
al-sharī‘ah discusses the goals of sharia (al-qāṣd al-tashrī‘ī) and also the purpose of creation (al-qāṣd al-khalq al-takwīnī). So, it can be concluded that the maqāṣid is the main approach in the three knowledge at the world level of mental processes.

Based on this description, a new approach, combining the two approaches, is proposed in the study of integrative science. It means that a study uses both the main and supporting approaches. The main approach is the maqāṣidī approach, where the knowledge of maqāṣid is its basis. The supporting approach is the approach and theory that applies in one science. Thus, the approach and theory of a science are not seen at the level of its singularity. Such integration applies circularly to three means of knowing human beings (senses, intellect and intuition), as illustrated in Figure 4.

CONCLUSION

This study can conclude that in the Islamic scientific tradition, the knowledge in the scientific and social sense is treated integratively. However, this is unclear due to the worldview that contradicts Islamic worldview. The perspective of the Islamic world which recognizes the three worlds provides an opportunity for the expression of a new scientific tool, namely the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah, positioned as meta-tafsir. The existence of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah forms a new structure of the Islamic knowledge, namely at the level of knowledge plurality. Maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah also discusses the purpose of creation (al-qāṣd al-khalq al-takwīnī), so it intersects with natural and social sciences. This is the circularity of Islamic scholarship proposed as a model of the integration between science and religion.

Based on the findings of this circularity model, integration can be carried out epistemologically with a circular integration model. At this level, the approach and theory of a science are not changed but moderated by a more general approach. It means that the approach of natural and social sciences at the particular level is used as a supporting approach. Meanwhile, at the level of the singularity, the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah is used as the main approach. Thus, a certain singular science
approach and theory is limited to the ‘physical world’ dimension only before it goes to the ‘world of mental processes’ where science circulates with information from ‘the world of pure metaphysics.’

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